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LEGAL PROTECTION AGAINST
TRANSBOUNDARY RADIATION
POLLUTION: A TREATY PROPOSAL
HELMUT J. HEISS *
INTRODUCTIONO VER the last several decades, environmental protection has increas-
ingly become an international legal concern.' However, as far as
transnational pollution is concerned, today's international legal system
still has important shortcomings which present major obstacles for legal
protection and victim compensation. In the narrower area of transna-
tional radiation pollution, the accident at the nuclear power plant at
Chernobyl in 1986 emphasized those shortcomings, as well as the inher-
ent consequences.
It is the goal of this Article to develop a proposal for an international
agreement which will ensure effective legal protection of victims m cases
of nuclear accidents causing transboundary radiation pollution. Part I of
this Article will describe the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power
Plant in the Ukraine in 1986 and its international consequences. In par-
ticular, it will address the lack of effective legal protection for victims of
that accident. In Part II, the Article examines problems with the legal
remedies currently available. Insofar as it is necessary to refer to na-
tional law within this section, the laws of Germany and the Umted States
are highlighted. There are several reasons for this. Germany and the
United States are highly industrialized countries and rely on nuclear en-
ergy Germany as a civil law country and the United States as a common
law country are each important representatives of different legal systems.
In addition, West Germany was one of the states wich was actually
affected by the Chernobyl accident. Thus, it is very helpful to look at the
way the German government addressed the subsequent problems. Part
III of the Article contains a proposal for an international agreement with
the goal of effectuating legal protection for private victims of trans-
boundary radiation pollution.2 Particular attention is paid to providing
effective legal protection in an efficient and politically practicable
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1. See Amedeo Postiglione, A More Efficient International Law on the Environment
and Setting Up an International Court for the Environment Within the United Nations, 20
ENVTL. L. 321 (1990); Daniel B. Magraw, Transboundary Harm: The International Law
Commission's Study of "International Liability, " 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 305 (1986).
2. Ann V Billingsley, Private Party Protection Against Transnational Radiation Pol-
lution Through Compulsory Arbitration: A Proposal, 14 CASE W RES. J. INT'L L. 339,
354 (1982).
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manner.
3
I. CHERNOBYL - THE "MODEL CASE"
An accident at a nuclear power plant could release highly radioac-
tive materials into the environment. Since radioactive pollution can
travel through the air, infiltrate waterways, or disperse into the sea,
opportunities abound for persons of one State to suffer radiation dam-
age caused by the activities of persons of another State.4
The accuracy of such a prediction was dramatically borne out by the
Chernobyl disaster.5 ' On April 26, 1986 at 1:23 a.m., an explosion at the
nuclear power plant at Chernobyl created a radioactive cloud.6 Because
of the winds at the time of the release, the cloud quickly moved to the
west. Only two days later the cloud had reached West Germany.7
Therefore, besides all the damage to the former Soviet Umon, radioactive
contamination also occurred in several other states.
While very good estimates were made as to the immediate damage, the
exact amount of long-term damage is hard to estimate.8 However, some
numbers referring to the situation in West Germany provide an idea of
the serious consequences of this accident. Until recently, the German
government indemnified its own citizens for a total amount of about DM
400 million (U.S. $260 million). Most of these payments (about DM 376
million or U.S. $245 million) were made immediately after the accident.
Additional payments were made by state governments, and those indem-
nification payments did not cover all the losses which occurred. For ex-
ample, subsequent susceptibility to and contraction of disease, long-term
consequences of the accident, are not reflected in those numbers.9
In spite of such enormous damage, none of the affected states brought
an action based on public international law for recovery.' 0 For instance,
the Swedish government expressly waived all rights to recovery 11 Tis
3. Id.
4. Id. at 340-41.
5. Id.
6. Hans-Josef Schneider & Jutta Stoll, Ersatz von Vermogensschaden in der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland aufgrund des Unfalls in Tschernobyl, 19 BETRIEBS BER-
ATER [BB] 1233 (1986); Victoria R. Hartke, The International Fallout from Chernobyl, 5
DICK. J. INT'L L. 319 (1987).
7. Judgment of Sept. 29, 1987, Amtsgencht Bonn [AG Bonn] [local trial court], 22
Neue Junstische Wochenschrift [NJW] 1393 (1988), 6 Praxis des Internationalen Private
und Verfahrensrechts [IPRAx] 351 (1988), afid, Landgencht Bonn [LG Bonn] [district
trial court], 6 IPRAx 354 (1988).
8. James K. Asselstine, The Future Of Nuclear Power after Chernobyl, 6 VA. J. NAT.
RES. L. 239, 240 (1987).
9. Bundesmimster fur Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit [German Minis-
try for Environment, Nature Preservation and Reactor Safety] [hereinafter B.U.N.R.],
Tschernobyl, Ein Jahr danach 16-23.
10. Billingsley, supra note 2, at 343. See also Lothar Gundling, Rechtsschutz nach
Tschernobyl, 6 IPRAx 338, 338-39 (1988) (commenting on Chernobyl litigation).
11. Alfred Rest, Tschernobyl und die internationale Haftung, 25 Versicherungsrecht
[VersR] 609, 609-10 n.4 (1986).
1993] TRANSBOUNDAR Y RADIATION POLLUTION 169
left the citizens of the polluted states virtually without any legal re-
course.12 In addition, individual victims saw themselves in too weak a
position to bring an action for recovery on their own.
13
Individual victims faced several problems in enforcing their rights.
These included the uncertainty of their legal situation, 14 pessimism that
any judgment would be enforced by the former Soviet Union and poten-
tially high litigation costs."s As a result, only one Chernobyl-related ac-
tion was brought in Germany 16 However, the action was not successful.
In that suit, the plaintiff was the owner of a house with a backyard
vegetable garden. As a result of the radiation pollution, he had to throw
away the vegetables he had grown, which he valued at DM 45 (U.S.
$2.90). In addition, he alleged damages in the amount of DM 705 (or
U.S. $45.50) for loss of the use of his backyard in the future. Thus, he
sought a total recovery of DM 750 (U.S. $48.40). In order to enforce his
rights, the plaintiff first applied for the financial support necessary to Ini-
tiate the suit. Such financial support (covering litigation costs as well as
attorney fees) is given to plaintiffs in Germany who otherwise could not
afford to bring an action. One of the eligibility requirements for financial
support is that there has to be a reasonable expectation of winning the
lawsuit. The court determined, however, that there was no expectation of
success for the plaintiff in this case and demed financial support. 17 The
plaintiff then brought suit against the former Soviet Umon. For several
reasons, especially those relating to questions of personal jurisdiction and
service of process, this lawsuit was not successful.
I8
The curious result was that although substantial damages, of at least
DM 400 million (U.S. $260 million), occurred in West Germany, the
costs were never recovered simply because the West German government
and other states did not attempt to bring any suits for damages resulting
from Chernobyl. This precluded any remedy because individual victims
were unable to enforce their rights on their own. Individuals in particu-
lar faced certain problems in executing their right to recovery, including:
" determining the identity of the operator of the nuclear plant;
* resolving personal jurisdiction issues;
" overcoming defenses of immunity;
* serving process abroad;
12. Id. The indemnification payments of the federal government of Germany only
transferred the losses from the individual victim to the tax payer. The economic loss for
West Germany and its citizens remained.
13. Linda A. Malone, The Chernobyl Accident: A Case Study in International Law
Regulating State Responsibility For Transboundary Nuclear Pollution, 12 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 203, 207 (1987).
14. Jillian Barron, Note, After Chernobyl: Liability for Nuclear Accidents Under In-
ternational Law, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 647, 647-48 (1987).
15. See discussion infra part III.
16. 22 NJW 1393, 6 IPRAx 351.
17. Id.
18. Judgment of Feb. 11, 1987, LG Bonn, 4 IPRAx 231 (1987), afl'd, Oberlandesger-
icht Koln [OLG Koln] [Court of Appeals], 4 IPRAx 233 (1987).
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* overcoming unusually disparate economic positions;
* confronting a lack of globally-unified liability rules;
* proving causation, and
* enforcing judgments.
These problems demonstrate the tremendous need for the development
of legal protection for victims of transboundary radiation pollution. Im-
mediately after the accident occurred, discussion was initiated to deter-
mine how such disasters could be prevented in the future, and when they
did occur, how to ensure legal protection for the victims. 19
Diplomatic communications, especially between the affected countries
and the former Soviet Union, took place.20 Mikhail Gorbachev declared,
in accordance with suggestions of politicians of western countries, that
international cooperation should be intensified in order to prevent such
accidents.2 This willingness to cooperate resulted in the adoption of two
international treaties on information and assistance in cases of nuclear
accidents within the organizational framework of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The treaty concerning information
came into force on October 27, 1986, and the treaty concerning mutual
assistance on February 26, 1987.22
During a special session of the General Conference of the IAEA on
September 24, 1986, West Germany mentioned the need for global nu-
clear liability rules.23 In 1990, the IAEA established a Standing Com-
mittee on Liability for Nuclear Damage, which was asked to work on
several liability issues. Furthermore, several participants expressed hope
that the disaster would strengthen international efforts to solve the legal
problems created by transboundary environmental pollution, notably in
Cases of accidents in nuclear power plants.24 The ongoing discussions
within the IAEA offer hope for better legal protection for victims in the
future.
II. THE PRACTICAL LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE CHERNOBYL CASE
According to the reports about the Chernobyl accident, the problems
19. Hans Blix, General Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency [herein-
after IAEA], visited the former Soviet Union on April 30, 1986, initiating diplomatic
relations on this issue. As a result, the Ambassador of the former Soviet Union contacted
the West German government. See Schneider & Stoll, supra note 6, at 1233.
20. Id.
21. Alexander Uschakow, Tschernobyl und das sowjetische Recht - Volkerrechtliche
Aspekte, 29 VersR 721 (1986).
22. Michael A. Heller, Chernobyl Fallout. Recent IAEA Conventions Expand Trans-
boundary Nuclear Pollution Law, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 651, 651 n.3 (1987).
23. B.U.N.R., supra note 9, § 2.2.
24. Alfred Rest, supra note 11, at 609, 620. See Gunther Kuhne, Haftung bei
grenzuberschreitenden Schaden aus Kernreaktor-unfallen, 35 NJW 2139, 2146 (1986);
Hartke, supra note 6, at 321; Richard E. Levy, International Law and the Chernobyl
Accident: Reflections on an Important but Imperfect System, 36 KAN. L. REv. 81, 81-82,
123 (1987); Gunther Handl, Transboundary Nuclear Accidents: The Post-ChernobylMul-
tilateral Legislative Agenda, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 203 (1988).
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noted below were the most challenging. With the help of references to
the U.S. legal system, it shall be shown that the same or very similar
problems would arise for U.S. citizens brnging a similar suit.
A. Whom to Sue? The Question of the Identity of the Defendant
According to German law, the operator of a nuclear plant is liable in
case of accidents, but in the Chernobyl accident, the identity of the oper-
ator was difficult to determine. Therefore, the plaintiff sued the former
Soviet Union.25 The court, however, stated that the nuclear plant was
operated by a separate entity called "AES Chernobyl" or Cernobyl'skaja
Atomnaja Elektrostancia.26 The question of whether AES Chernobyl
was a separate entity depended on the degree of influence the administra-
tion of the former Soviet Umon had on the management of that entity 27
This question would have to be answered in accordance with the actual
structure of the Soviet Administration. Thus, extensive research of the
Soviet legal system had to be done to determine the identity of the
operator.
The difficulty of this task was illustrated by the failure of investigators
to learn basic facts about the accident. At a July 10, 1986 symposium in
Munich concerning legal protection after Chernobyl, it was noted that
the identity of potential defendants was still unclear.28
The problem of identifying liable parties is not due to the lack of estab-
lished rules governing liability issues but the complexities of determining
who is an operator, a question which must be answered in accordance
with the internal law of the state where an accident occurs. Plaintiffs
also must determine whether the state itself or a separate entity is an
operator. In the case of a separate entity, the name and address must be
determined. This, as the Chernobyl case shows, can be troublesome.
B. Personal Jurisdiction29
It is common m such accidents that the operator of the nuclear plant
had no other contacts in the forum state other than the harmful effect of
the disaster. This situation immediately raises the question of whether a
plaintiff may file a suit in his home country, i.e., the question of personal
jurisdiction of the state where the harm occurred.
25. 22 NJW 1393, 6 IPRAX 351.
26. Id. See Georg Brunner & Carmen Schmidt, Tschernobyl und die internationale
Haftung, 33(a) VersR 833-34 (1986).
27. 22 NJW 1393, 6 IPRAx 351. Heintz-Peter Mansel, Zivilrechtliche Schadenser-
satzklagen gegen auslandische Kernkraftwerksbetreiber - Ein Vortragsbericht, 6 IPRAx
392, 393 (1986). See also Gundling, supra note 10, at 340.
28. Mansel, supra note 27, at 393. See also, Gundling, supra note 10, at 340 (explain-
ing that the situation was so complicated that even experts in the law of eastern countries
had tremendous difficulties providing precise answers).
29. See generally, Gary B. Born, Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in International
Cases, 17 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (1987).
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Under German law,3" this question is easy to answer. According to
Section 32 ZPO, the plaintiff may bring an action in the court having
geographical jurisdiction over the place where the harm occurred. As a
general rule under the German legal system, whenever the ZPO gives the
plaintiff a forum, this forum has personal jursdiction.31
In the Chernobyl case the court decided to the contrary However, the
court confused personal jurisdiction with local jurisdiction. There was
certainly personal jurisdiction within German courts; the plaintiff, how-
ever, brought his action at a locally incompetent court.32
The question may create problems under United States law American
courts have granted due process guarantees to foreigners.33 This means
that courts can assert personal jurisdiction only when the defendant has
sufficient mimmum contacts in the United States.34
Under American law, sufficient mimmum contacts can establish either
general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction.35  General jurisdiction is
based on continuous relationships of the defendant to the United States
(e.g. domicile or continuous activities within the United States). A
causal relation between the contacts of the defendant and the actual oc-
currence is not necessary
Specific jurisdiction is based on a single contact of the defendant with
the United States, which bears a causal relationship to the actual case in
issue. This means that the plaintiff can bring an action "arising out of"
or "related to" the defendant's activities within the United States (as the
forum state). According to the United States Supreme Court decisions,
this requires a two part test: 1) the defendant must have "purposefully
availed itself of the forum's law," and 2) the assertion of jurisdiction
must be "reasonable., 36 According to Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior
Court of California, these requirements are only fulfilled in the case of an
"action of the defendant purposefully directed at the forum State.",37
The mere awareness of the defendant that one of the products manufac-
tured by him might end up in the forum state and cause harm there is not
sufficient. This opinion of the Court, however, was not unanimous. Fur-
thermore, as both parties in this case were foreigners, the Court was cor-
30. Zivilprozessordnung (German Code of Civil Procedure) [hereinafter ZPO] § 32.
This provision reads: "[tior actions in tort, the court at the place where the tort has been
committed is competent." (Translation by the author).
31. Heintz-Peter Mansel, Zustellung ener Klage in Sachen "Tschernobyl," 4 IPRAx
210, 210-13 (1987).
32. Id. at 213.
33. See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984);
Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1985); Afram
Export Corp. v. Metallurgiki Halyps, S.A., 772 F.2d 1358 (7th Cir. 1985).
34. National contacts are sufficient. See, e.g., Cyromedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd., 397
F Supp. 287 (D. Conn. 1975).
35. See generally GARY BORN & DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LIGA-
TION IN UNITED STATES COURTS (1989).
36. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 35, at 43.
37. 480 U.S. 102, 110, (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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rect in stating that the interest of the plaintiff to have a forum within the
United States was only limted. Thus, it is unclear which concrete con-
clusions should be drawn from Asahi.
For cases of transboundary nuclear accidents, this means that Amen-
can courts normally will not have general jurisdiction (if the United
States is the victims' state). There are usually no contacts of the opera-
tors of nuclear plants with foreign states other than the fact of causation
of harm in cases of accidents.38 The question of whether there would be
specific jurisdiction is unclear. Whatever the outcome would be, poten-
tial plaintiffs would face severe problems in convincing the court to assert
specific jurisdiction.
C. Use of the Immunity Defense for Operators
When it is possible to convince a United States court that it has juris-
diction, the plaintiff may face an even greater hurdle, defendant's immu-
nity defense. For this discussion it is necessary to distinguish cases where
the state itself is the operator and cases where a separate entity is the
operator.
1. State Operates the Nuclear Power Plant Itself
Since it was believed that the state was the operator, the suit in the
Chernobyl case was brought against the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the
state maintained absolute immunity While the German court could eas-
ily deny immunity, it chose not to do so in this case. In accordance with
public international law, it distinguished between acts zure imperii (for
which immunity is granted) and acts iure gestionis (for which immunity
is demed). The characterization in the Chernobyl suit, however, was
made solely according to rules of German law. Therefore, as production
and supply of energy is left to private enterprises in Germany, no immu-
nity could be granted to the former Soviet Union. This characterization
would be necessary to make sure that foreign states cannot gain the ad-
vantage of immunity by voluntarily choosing a public way of conducting
activities which are privately organized in West Germany 39 Describing
a state's act as zure imperii or iure gestionis solely according to the law of
the forum state oversimplifies the problem. Since each state has its own
system, the scope of immunity would vary, being always dependent on
where the action was brought. Moreover, this contradicts the fact that
immumty is granted by public international law and therefore cannot be
defined by each state in its own way
It is quite easy for a state to allege and prove that an act zure imperii
was the cause of the accident. With the Chernobyl accident, the former
Soviet Union could have pleaded that the accident occurred as a result of
38. BORN & WESTiN, supra note 35, at 25.
39. 22 NJW 1393, 6 IPRAx 351. See also European Convention on State Immunity,
May 16, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 470.
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producing plutonium for military purposes or a military experiment exe-
cuted in this plant."
United States courts also distinguish between acts lure imperii and acts
zure gestionis.41 The characterization is made in accordance with the
American system but in a more functional way. This means that activi-
ties of foreign states which are executed in a private way in the U.S.
might still be characterized as acts zure imperii. A case in point is In re
SEDCO, Inc.,42 wich dealt with activities that are probably character-
ized imtially as "private" However, the court held the fact that "drilling
an exculpatory oil well in its patrimonial waters" was an act zure imperil
because it was "integral to the Mexican government's long range plan-
ning and policy making process concerning the production and utiliza-
tion of state-owned minerals."'43 Very similar arguments can be made in
cases of accidents at nuclear plants, giving states a rather easy opportu-
nity to escape liability
2. Separate Entity Operates Nuclear Power Plant
When the plant is operated by a separate entity (as was the case with
the nuclear power plant at Chernobyl),' the question of the immunity of
such entities arises. Since the action in the Chernobyl case was brought
against the Soviet Union, the court did not deal with this question. Nev-
ertheless, there is a clear legal rule in Germany that separate entities,
even if they are owned and controlled by the state, are never entitled to
immunity 45 In other words, immunity is only granted to states not to
state-owned enterprises.46 This stands in contrast to the legal situation in
the United States, where the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act grants
immunity not only to the state itself but also to its "agencies" and "in-
strumentalities."'47 Thus, the argument of German lawyers that immu-
mty may not be granted to state-owned enterprises does not work.
Again, a case in point is In re SEDCO, Inc.,4" which dealt with a "sepa-
rate entity," this is comparable to the "AES Chernobyl."49
D. Service of Process
A third obstacle in the plaintiff's path is that of performing an ade-
quate service of process. One of the most basic notions of the laws of
civilized countries is that there can be no judgment against the defendant
40. Mansel, supra note 27, at 393 n.3; Mansel, supra note 31, at 213 n.40.
41. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 35, at 336.
42. 543 F Supp. 561 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
43. Id. at 566.
44. See supra Part I. 1.
45. Mansel, supra note 31, at 213 n.40.
46. Id. at 213.
47. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (1988) [hereinaf-
ter FSIA]. See also Levy, supra note 24, at 121-22.
48. 543 F Supp. 561 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
49. See supra Part II.A.
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without notification of the action brought against him. However, in in-
ternational litigation this creates the problem of "service of process
abroad.""0 In the absence of international treaties, the plaintiff is depen-
dent on the good will of the foreign state to execute a request for service
of process. But even if there is an international treaty regulating this
question, it is probable that the foreign state will not execute a request for
service of process. Such international treaties usually contain clauses al-
lowing states not to follow a request if this would infringe on their sover-
eignty or would be contrary to the public policy of the foreign state. 51 As
nuclear plants are usually run by the state itself or by state owned "pri-
vate" enterprises, it may be easy to allege an infringement of sovereignty
or a public policy concern. The fact that the question of an infringement
of the sovereignty or a public policy concern is only decided by the for-
eign state itself, combined with the huge amounts of money which are at
stake in international tort cases arising out of accidents in nuclear power
plants, increases the incentive to reject requests for service of process.52
The possibility remains that the victims' state can create substitutes for
actual service of process (e.g., "public service" under section 203 II, III
ZPO of Germany).53 This provision allows "service of process" by an-
nouncing the claim in daily newspapers when actual service of process
proves impossible or at least unreasonable. However, section 203 II ZPO
has been interpreted very restrictively (in order not to undermine due
process guarantees) and was therefore not applied in the Chernobyl
case54 (notwithstanding the fact that the German administration had pre-
viously declared that it would not transmit requests for service of process
to the former Soviet Umon).5 '
An American plaintiff would face the same problem. The United
States is a party to the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judi-
cial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters of
1965 and the Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory 56 The
Hague Convention contains a sovereignty clause; the Inter-American
Convention contains a public policy clause.5 Thus, even if the source
state of the radiation pollution is a member of either of the two Conven-
tions, its courts will probably deny service of process by alleging an in-
fringement of sovereignty or public policy Whenever the source state is
50. See generally BORN & WESTIN, supra note 35, at 119.
51. Mansel, supra note 31, at 211.
52. Id.
53. See supra Part II.B.
54. 4 IPRAx 231.
55. Mansel, supra note 31, at 213.
56. Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Docu-
ments in Civil or Commercial Matters, 16 I.L.M. 1339 (1977); Inter-American Conven-
tion on Letters Rogatory, art. I, 24 I.L.M. 472 (1985). See BORN & WESTIN, supra note
35, at 136-37 and apps. C, D and E.
57. Id.
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not a member of either Convention, courts can deny the execution of the
letter rogatory without any reason.
E. Difficulty in Litigation: Inequality of Litigants
The sheer number of potential plaintiffs and their inversely proportion-
ate strength accentuates the other obstacles inherent in transboundary
radiation pollution suits. A disaster like the Chernobyl accident affects
all inhabitants of a polluted state. Generally, injured persons see them-
selves in a comparatively weak position. Without the help of well-edu-
cated international lawyers, potential plaintiffs cannot determine their
legal position. The problems created by the confluence of public mterna-
tional law, the law of the source state and the law of the victims' state,
demand the experience of specialists in international environmental law.
Thus, victims are not likely to take any steps because they may face sig-
nificant expenses without great hope of recovery. The risk of wasting
money is too high. Even worse, injured persons may be unaware of these
sizable legal costs. Moreover, the defendant is likely to increase costs by
prolonging trials as much as possible. In addition, there is often a lan-
guage barrier and, more importantly, a lack of access to evidence.58
Since the plaintiff has to prove the facts on which his claim is based, he
needs information about the nuclear power plant itself, which is usually
kept secret. The defendant, in contrast, is either the source state or a
large enterprise. It typically has full access to evidence, sufficiently so-
phisticated employees and enough assets to pay attorneys who are spe-
cialists in the field.
The need for "equality in legal representation" between potential
plaintiffs and defendants was recognized after the Chernobyl accident.59
De legeferenda was suggested as a means of obliging operators of nuclear
power plants to take legal expenses insurance at their own cost to provide
for compensation to potential victims. This would allow victims seeking
recovery to have litigation costs refunded out of an insurance contract
procured by the operator of the nuclear power plant. The imbalance in
power between plaintiff and defendant would be equalized, creating addi-
tional econolmc incentives for operators of nuclear plants to prevent ac-
cidents. Under present law in Germany, only the operators of nuclear
plants must possess liability insurance;6" a plaintiff cannot even obtain
legal expense insurance because the general terms for legal expense insur-
ance exclude actions based on nuclear injuries from its coverage.61
58. The international treaties' rulings on taking evidence abroad pose the same
problems as the treaties concerning service of process abroad.
59. Fritz Reichert-Facilides, Versicherungsrechtliche Uberlegungen nach dem Tscher-
nobyl Unfall, 75 Die Versicherungs Praxis [VP] 159 (1986).
60. Gesetz uber die friedliche Verwendung der Kernenergie und den Schutz gegen
ihre Gefahren (Deuches Atomgesetz und Strahlenschutzrecht) [AtG] § 13.
61. Teil A. Text, Allgemeine Bedingungen fur die Rechtsschutzversicherung, [ARB]
(General Terms for Legal Expenses Insurance) art. 4.
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F. Problem of Differences in Applicable Substantive Law
Besides the procedural difficulties, the international nature of trans-
boundary radiation pollution suits creates substantive questions. De-
pending on the particular rules of private international law of the forum
state, a court can apply, for example, the domestic tort law of the source
state (lex loci delicti commzssi) or of the victims' state. The laws of each
sovereign may differ significantly. Differences in liability rules for nu-
clear accidents create problems for both the operator of the plant as well
as for the victim.
1. Position of the Victim
In the absence of more advantageous liability rules of a source state,
victims are usually protected by their own state law For example, in the
Chernobyl case, the plaintiff, according to German rules of private inter-
national law, could have chosen between the law of the Soviet Umon or
Germany Thus, victims were at least protected by the law of their
country.62
However, from a practical point of view, the differences in substantive
law are disadvantageous for the plaintiff. Here again the problem of en-
forceability of a judgment arises. Considering the vast liability costs at
stake after accidents like the one at Chernobyl, source states have strong
incentives not to enforce judgments of the victims' state which are based
on conflicting foreign law Judgments which are not enforced in the
source state are usually worthless, unless the operator has sufficient as-
sets in the victims' state or third party states, which are willing to enforce
the judgment.
2. Position of the Operator
Due to the differences in private international law and the substantial
laws of the potentially affected states, the operator rarely will be able to
calculate ex ante the probable amount of liability. The calculation of
"expected losses," however, is necessary in order to be able to determine
the degree of reasonable care as well as the appropriate amount of finan-
cial resources. The operator will also argue that victims' states are biased
in favor of potential plaintiffs and it is unable to limit the consequences of
nuclear accidents to states with, from their perspective, reasonable liabil-
ity rules.
3. International Treaties which Unify Liability Rules
There are two international treaties which try to unify the liability
rules applicable to accidents at nuclear power plants; they are the Pans
62. See Malone, supra note 13, at 206 (discussing the inadequacy of domestic law to
protect the global environment); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN REL.
LAW § 602 (1987) (discussing the availability of private remedies under state law).
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Convention of 196063 and the Vienna Convention of 1963.61 Both agree-
ments provide for private remedies for victims bringing actions against
the operator of a nuclear power plant. However, the agreements contain
shortcomings.
In light of the fact that providing a legal remedy for radiation pollu-
tion is a global concern, the small degree of participation is alarming.6"
The Paris Convention is based only on European activities. The Euro-
pean Nuclear Energy Agency, which was established within the frame-
work of the EEC, oversees the goals of that Convention. The Vienna
Convention is currently in force only m fourteen states (the most impor-
tant users of atomic energy failing to join). Four other states have signed
but not yet ratified the Convention. With the help of the Joint Protocol
of 1988, the IAEA tried to merge the two Conventions. The benefits of
each Convention are extended to the member states of the other. This
Joint Protocol has been signed by twenty-two countries and came into
force in 1992.
Both Conventions limit the damages compensable. Indemnification is
limited to personal injury, death or loss of property 66 For example,
evacuation costs or damages to the general environment are not recover-
able. For mere economic losses, the situation is unclear.67
The Pans Convention interferes with public international law because
it limits the scope of the source state's liability For example, the source
state has all the defenses of the operator, especially force majeure and
amounts of liability.68 Obviously, a rethinking of the lirmts of liability of
operators is needed.69 As a result, the IAEA has already drafted a pro-
posal for a Convention on Supplementary Funding.
4. Insufficiency of Customary Public International Law for Private
Parties' Protection
The solution that customary public international law provides for the
problems arising in transboundary radiation suits is illusory It is well
recognized in customary public international law that source states can
be liable in cases of transboundary radiation pollution. 70 Liability can
63. Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, July 29,
1960, 956 U.N.T.S. 251 [hereinafter Pans Convention].
64. Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage May 21, 1963, 2 I.L.M. 727
(1963) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
65. 22 NJW 1393, 6 IPRAx 351 (Soviet Union was not a party to either Convention).
66. Handl, supra note 24, at 234.
67. Kuhne, supra note 24, at 2144.
68. Handl, supra note 24, at 232.
69. Handl, supra note 24, at 204 ("prompt and full compensation"). See also Op-
tional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations Concerning the Com-
pulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 3374, T.I.A.S. 7502.
70. Barron, supra note 14; JAMES BARROS & DOUGLAS M. JOHNSTON, THE INTER-
NATIONAL LAW OF POLLUTION (1974); Gunther Handl, The Environment: International
Rights and Responsibilities, 74 PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 223 (1980); ALEXANDER
CHARLES KIss, SURVEY OF CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRON-
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result from state responsibility for the accident, or because international
duties to prevent such accidents were violated, such as a duty to immedi-
ately inform neighbor states about accidents or provide standards of
safety.71 However, as private parties are not subject to rights arising
under the law of nations, they cannot base their action on a source state's
liability under public international law.72 Victims therefore would have
to convince their state to bring an action against the source state. The
political implications of such an action are obvious and as mentioned
above, none of the states affected by the Chernobyl accident actually
brought an action.
This philosophy was also followed by the court in the Chernobyl case
in West Germany. Only the affected state, not individuals themselves,
could enforce rights under public international law.73
The Umted States Restatement of Foreign Relations Law takes a more
progressive approach in that it holds a state obliged to "accord to the
person injured (or exposed to such risk) access to the same judicial or
admnistrative remedies as are available in smailar circumstances to per-
sons within the state."'74 However, this only gives foreigners the same
rights as citizens of the sovereign, it does not give foreigners substantive
rights under public international law
G. Special Problems Concerning Causation"
In addition to the more exotic encumbrances to transboundary suits,
the plaintiff faces the ordinary challenge of proving causation. Interna-
tional opinions differ greatly on issues of causation, particularly with re-
gard to requiring greater regulation of the nuclear power industry and
providing proof as to actual damages.
1. Regulatory Action of the Victims' State
In order to prevent further harm and to mitigate already existing dam-
ages, regulatory steps were taken after the Chernobyl accident by several
states. Especially regarding contaminated food, prohibitions to import
or sell were enacted. For example, the EEC Council enacted a regulation
which defined the maximum contamination of agricultural products
MENTAL LAW (1976); Levy, supra note 24; JAN SCHNEIDER, WORLD PUBLIC ORDER OF
THE ENVIRONMENT: TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL ECOLOGICAL LAW AND ORGANI-
ZATION (1979); ALLEN SPRINGER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLUTION (1983);
Magraw, supra note 1, at 305; Lothar Gundling, Verantwortlichkeit der Staaten fur
grenzuberschreitende Umweltbeentrachtigungen, 45 Zeitschrift fur Auslandisches Offen-
tliches Recht und Volkerrecht [ZaoeRV] 265 (1985).
71. In the Chernobyl case, such violations committed by the former Soviet Umon
were alleged. Gundling, supra note 10, at 339.
72. Gundling, supra note 10; Kuhne, supra note 24, at 2145.
73. 22 NJW 1393, 6 IPRAX 351.
74. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN REL. LAW § 602(2) (1987).
75. Handl, supra note 24, at 242.
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from other countries.7 6 However, in different countries, different limits
of contamination were applied. The sale of milk between states is a good
illustration; 77 the limit for iodine-131 in milk differed from twenty
becquerel (in Hessen, Germany) to 2000 becquerel (in the United King-
dom and Sweden).
Those differing international standards raise the question of the rea-
sonableness of the regulatory steps of some victims' states and support an
argument for "interruption of the chain of causation" for the operator.78
For example, it could have been argued that prohibitions of the sale of
certain types of food were unreasonable because the food was, though
contaminated, not yet dangerous.79 In other words, the operator could
have argued that the unreasonable prohibitions of the victims' state and
not the accident were the real cause of the harm (especially loss of profits
because of the prohibition against selling the food).
2. Damages Provable Only On an "Aggregate Basis"
Another problem is the fact that radiation p611ution causes damages
which are provable on an aggregate basis but not on an individual basis, 0
such as an increase in certain diseases like cancer."' Moreover, a certain
number of these diseases would have occurred anyway
Two possible situations could arise. The increase of diseases might be
small (e.g., 10%), in which case an individual plaintiff could not prove
that his disease was actually caused by the accident. Even under a 'pre-
ponderance of the evidence' rule, the fact that the incidence of disease
was increased by only 10% would make causation more unlikely than
likely, meaning that none of the injured could recover.8 2
On the other hand, if the incidence of disease is increased by slightly
more than 10%, each plaintiff could recover (even those whose disease
was not caused by the accident).83 The preponderance of the evidence
rule would favor all persons suffering from the disease.
H. Enforceability of the Right to Recover
As mentioned above, judgments are valuable only if they are enforcea-
ble. In the case of transboundary radiation pollution, a source state has
an incentive not to enforce a foreigu judgment, and the ugh cost at stake
makes a source state likely to create reasons not to enforce the
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Mansel, supra note 27, at 394.
79. Brunner & Schmidt, supra note 26, at 839.
80. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
TORT LAW 260-61 (1987).
81. Barron, supra note 14, at 647 n.3.
82. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 80, at 262 (noting the "underdeterrence"
problem).
83. Id. (noting the "overdeterrence" problem).
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judgment.84
Furthermore, it must be expected that operators of nuclear power
plants will not be able to pay all the damages themselves. Consequently,
the Paris Convention and the Vienna Convention contain provisions en-
suring the liquidity of the operator up to the amount of liability set forth
in those treaties.85 Tis forces the operator to maintain insurance or
other financial security. However, besides the general problem of low
participation rates among the two treaties, there is also no right of the
victim to sue the liability insurer directly. Tins question is left to na-
tional legislation.86
III. A SOLUTION: THE PROPOSAL OF AN INTERNATIONAL TREATY
In order to provide legal protection to victims of transboundary radia-
tion pollution, cooperation among all states is required. With the help of
an international treaty, current problems could be surmounted. The for-
mation of a liability agreement is also recommended.87 The following
discussion reviews the essential aspects of such an international treaty.
As stated m the introduction, the goal is to ensure effective legal protec-
tion of victims of transboundary radiation pollution in an efficient, politi-
cally practicable and legally manageable way.
A. Liability Effectuated by Private Remedies as the Right Approach88
There are different approaches to solving the problem of indemnifica-
tion of victims. One is to establish liability rules winch protect potential
victims. The other alternatives are to have each state bear the burden of
its own damages through insurance or funds solutions.8 9
Nevertheless, if every state bore the costs of its own damages, real in-
demnification would still not be afforded to the victims. Even if an af-
fected state indemnifies its own citizens, tins only translates to a shifting
of losses from individuals to the public, thus placing the burden on the
taxpayer. Furthermore, countries which do not use nuclear energy
would be discriminated against. The only justification, if any, for tins
system, is that users of nuclear energy should also contribute to the losses
winch their use causes. By defintion, tins justification would not apply
to countries which do not use nuclear energy 90
84. Malone, supra note 13, at 239.
85. Pans Convention, supra note 63, art. X, 956 U.N.T.S. at 270; Vienna Conven-
tion, supra note 64, art. VII, 2 I.L.M. at 737.
86. Pans Convention, supra note 63, art. VI, U.N.T.S. at 267; Vienna Convention,
supra note 64, art. II, 2 I.L.M. at 730.
87. See Heller, supra note 22, at 663 (explaining that there would be "substantial
constituency backing negotiations for a liability convention"); Barron, supra note 14, at
668.
88. Barron, supra note 14, at 665; Postiglione, supra note 1, at 322.
89. Handl, supra note 24, at 224.
90. Id. at 227.
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Finally, there is an underdeterrence problem. The fact that there
would be no liability for operators for transboundary harm would make
the operators deduct those damages from the calculated expected losses
resulting from accidents. The amount of expected losses, however, is de-
cisive for the efficient standard of care. A decrease in the expected losses
leads to a decrease m care by the operator.91
Other solutions would be insurance or fund constructions not under
the auspices of individual states. By insuring potential victims or giving
them a right for recovery against international funds, indemnification
could be guaranteed. These systems are similar to the no fault systems
which are used partly for automobile accidents. However, the same un-
derdeterrence problem, as explained above, would arise.92
Liability rules are the preferable solution. First, the use of liability
rules provides indemnification for the victims, a desirable result. Fur-
thermore, effective liability rules have a deterrence effect and thus give
the correct incentives to the parties. It is the best way to make operators
of nuclear installations take reasonable precautions.93 However, the op-
erator of a nuclear installation is likely to calculate the gravity of injury
by considering only those damages for which he can effectively be held
liable. As long as transboundary damages are not effectively recoverable,
he has an incentive to take less precaution than actually required.94 It
follows that the most effective liability rules would give private victims of
nuclear accidents an enforceable right to recovery
It is sometimes said that private law is not an appropriate means to
solve problems of transboundary pollution. The reason for this is not
based on the nature of private law but rather on the fact that public
international law sometimes blocks private remedies.95 Following this
reasoning however, the conclusion should be that public international
law should provide appropriate conditions to effectuate private remedies.
The two bodies of law should complement one another.
This does not mean that regulations are not helpful or desirable.
Safety standards, licensing requirements for operators, as well as criminal
sanctions are important for an effective system of international environ-
mental protection. In international cases, public regulation and private
remedies should work together as they do in domestic laws.
91. Compare the reasonable care standard under the Judge Learned Hand Formula
infra note 93.
92. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK 53-57 (1986).
93. According to U.S. tort doctrine, precautions are reasonable if the burden of pre-
caution is less than the probability of harm times the gravity of the injury; (B>PxL).
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 80, at 85; W PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS sec. 17 (5th ed. 1984).
94. Joseph P Tomain & Constance D. Burton, Nuclear Transition: From Three Mile
Island to Chernobyl, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV 363, 369 (1987).
95. Malone, supra note 13, at 237.
1993] TRANSBOUNDAR Y RADIATION POLLUTION 183
B. International Registration of Operators of Nuclear Power Plants
Problems of determining the identity of the defendant are not umque
to the context of nuclear accidents. In several countries, similar
problems have led to a registration requirement, such as with motor ven-
eles. The same requirement, on an international basis, would avoid all
the difficulties m researching the name, address and other statistics of the
defendant. A registration requirement would be easy to administer and
extremely helpful for potential victims.
Each state should have an obligation to name the operator of the nu-
clear installations in its country. Failure to notify would make the par-
ticular state liable.
A step in tis direction was already taken at the Pans Convention.
96
Each contracting state is obliged to submit a conclusive listing of all nu-
clear installations used for peaceful purposes and situated in its tern-
tory.9 7 However, a registration of the installation operator is not
required.
C. Procedural Problems
There are key principles of procedural law which must be addressed in
ensuring equitable legal protection. These include the use of mandatory
arbitration, the class action device where there are multiple potential liti-
gants and general procedural rules that may require redefinition.
1. Basic Principle: Mandatory Arbitration
In order to ensure private party protection against transnational radia-
tion pollution, a general proposal has been made for mandatory arbitra-
tion and is among similar proposals currently being discussed within the
IAEA.9' Indeed, it is the best way to effectuate legal protection. 99 Many
of the problems with ensuring the protection of the victims are well
known in other contexts, especially in international commerce. The most
effective existing solution for these problems is international arbitration.
Many of the reasons for the development of international arbitration in
general are of special importance in the context of protection of private
parties against injuries resulting from nuclear accidents. 100 Most impor-
tantly, arbitration provides a neutral forum for both parties. In contrast,
96. Pans Convention, supra note 63, art. XIII, §§ (a)-(c), 956 U.N.T.S. at 270-71.
97. Id.
98. Billingsley, supra note 2, at 355. See also Levy, supra note 24, at 106-07; Report of
the Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage, IAEA Doe. SCNL/4/INF.6
(Dec. 12, 1991); Liability for Nuclear Damage, Draft Resolution recommended by the
Committee of the Whole, 36th Regular Session of the General Conference of the IAEC,
IAEA Doc. GC(XXXVI)/RES/1047 (Sept. 24, 1992).
99. Although arbitration is no panacea, it gives good results in many cases. See, e.g.,
Heller, supra note 22, at 653; Sharon McBrayer, Recent Developments: Chernobyl's Legal
Fallout - The Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, 17 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 303 (1986).
100. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 35, at 609.
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litigation at courts of one state always contains the possibility of bias and,
as a result, non-recogmition of the judgment by the other state.
The consensual basis of arbitration also prevents multiple litigation of
the same case in different states. The problem of multiple litigation is
well known in international cases which are brought at national courts.
One result was the development of so called anti-suit injunctions.0 1 If,
however, states would agree to arbitrate the liability question in cases of
transboundary nuclear accidents, jurisdiction would be transferred to the
arbitral body and no conflict between courts of different states could
arise.
Furthermore, arbitration can be adjusted to different legal systems.
This should dimmish the reluctance of states to recogmze proceedings
conducted out of their own control. One main reason for this is that
arbitration proceedings are usually less formal and rigid than proceed-
ings at state courts.
International courts, such as the International Court of Justice, pres-
ent a problem for private parties since they cannot bring actions there.
Individual victims must rely on their own government to bring an action
for them. The Chernobyl accident showed that states, for whatever rea-
sons, are reluctant to do so. Furthermore, international courts only de-
termine rights under public international law. The liability of operators,
which is based on private law, can only be enforced in national courts.
The problems with such attempts, however, have already been
demonstrated.
Arbitration would open the possibility of determining rights under
both bodies of law (source state's liability under public international law
as well as operator's liability under private law) without confusing the
two and without any need to change the basic principles of either. Public
international law and private law should be reconciled in this area.10 2
In cases of nuclear power plant accidents that have international ef-
fects, considerable political and diplomatic implications make the general
arguments favoring arbitration even stronger. For many countries, use
of nuclear energy is of essential macroeconomic importance. These
countries do not want to jeopardize their use of this energy source be-
cause of heavy burdens of liability. To provide countries with an incen-
tive to expose their own energy producing enterprises to international
liability they must be offered a flexible system based on mutual consent,
such as arbitration. Arbitration has already proved to be a desirable way
to resolve international disputes concerning environmental pollution. 10 3
101. Id. at 242.
102. Handl, supra note 24, at 248. "An entirely new convention - one that essentially
embodies a private law approach, yet also incorporates elements of source states' interna-
tional liability - clearly is the preferable solution." Id.
103. Billingsley, supra note 2, at 342 n.12; Hartke, supra note 6, at 326.
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.2. Forms of Arbitration
One important argument made in favor of arbitration is its low cost.Y1
4
Because different types of arbitration can vary in expense, tis argument
is generally not true and requires further examination.
There are two types of arbitration: institutional arbitration and ad hoe
arbitration.'l 5 Institutional arbitration is provided by international orga-
inzations or agencies. Their administrative costs may be very high and
must be borne by the arbitrating parties in full amount. 10 6 Considering
that nuclear accidents are comparatively rare, administrative costs
should be kept as low as possible. Therefore, the creation of a new arbi-
tration organization should be avoided.' 07
On the other hand, ad hoc arbitration does not meet all the needs in-
volved here. Ad hoe arbitration per definitionem only refers to single
disputes and can be agreed on in tort cases typically only after the acci-
dent has occurred.
Thus, there must be some "institutionalized" arbitral proceeding, and
a mixture of institutional and ad hoc arbitration may be the right ap-
proach. The proposed treaty should provide for mandatory arbitration
for all future disputes. The necessary functions should be served by al-
ready existing organizations (e.g., IAEA).108 The rules of procedure
should be predefined. The arbitral tribunal itself, however, would be cre-
ated on a case by case basis.109 This would keep costs low but at the
same time guarantee all of the benefits of institutional arbitration. 10 The
relatively small number of accidents makes this approach manageable.
3. Rules of Procedure
As mentioned above, the rules of procedure must be defined before-
hand. However, there is no need to create new and special rules, ill
because already several bodies of rules formulated in other contexts have
proven successful." 2
Considering the sovereignty concerns and the political implications of
arbitration of transnational nuclear accident cases, '1 the most appropri-
104. Billingsley, supra note 2, at 357.
105. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 35, at 607.
106. Francis J. Higgins et al., Pitfalls in International CommercialArbitration, 35 Bus.
LAW. 1035, 1041 (1980).
107. Note the expensive proceedings where arbitration is conducted under the Conven-
tion on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States, arts. VI, VII, 2 B.D.I.E.L. 947 (1991).
108. See infra Part III.E.
109. Higgins, supra note 106, at 1044.
110. Postiglione, supra note 1.
111. See generally Billingsley, supra note 2.
112. See, e.g., Joseph T. McLaughlin, Arbitration and Developing Countries, 13 INT'L
LAW. 211 (1979).
113. See, e-g., Texaco-Libya award in Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (1977)
(noting that there would be no immunity defense if states would agree to arbitrate).
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ate example is the rules of procedure of the International Center for Set-
tlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). 4 These rules are based on the
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States.115 The Administrative Council adopted the
rules pursuant to article six of this Convention. The rules are divided
into "Institution Rules""1 6 and "Arbitration Rules"1 17 and govern all
questions concerning the request to arbitrate, the establishment of the
tribunal, the working of the tribunal, general and special procedures and
the award (including interpretation, revision and annulment). These
rules could be adopted, mutatis mutandis, to the particular needs here.
Changes to the ICSID rules are necessary For example, there is no
need to create a special "Center" which only provides arbitration because
of the small number of accidents. With these rules of procedure,
problems concerning personal jurisdiction and service of process might
be resolved.
4. Class Action Brought by the State for its Victims
It has been suggested that each private party should be able to present
its own case in front of the arbitration tribunal.1 I A precondition would
be to get the approval of a special state organization (which could be
established by each signatory state). Tins would be appropriate in the
initial phases of such cases.' 9 However, for the following reasons an
aggregated claim would be preferable.
First, allowing individual arbitration would lead to a tremendous rise
in the number of cases to be resolved. As the Chernobyl accident shows,
the whole population of foreign states can be affected by a comparable
disaster. This would not only overburden the administrative responsibili-
ties of the arbitrators but would multiply legal costs. Under a class ac-
tion approach, there would be only one arbitral proceeding for each
affected state. Legal costs and aspects of investigative costs (e.g., expert
witnesses) would arise only once.
Additionally, whenever a state represents its victims in an arbitration
proceeding with the operator of the nuclear installation or the source
state, the problem of inequality of representation disappears. Two
equally powerful parties would arbitrate the case. 120
114. See generally C.F Amerasrnghe, How to Use the International Centre for Settle-
ient of Investment Disputes by Reference to its Model Clauses, 13 IND. J. INT'L L. 5301973).
115. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, ICSID BASIC Docu-
MENTS 15 (1985) [hereinafter ICSID BASIC DOCUMENTS] (text is available in each offi-
cial language of the Centre).
1 116. Id. at 55-60. Conciliation Rules, part E, are also included but of less importance
here.
117. Id. at 61-89.
118. Billingsley, supra note 2, at 356.
119. Id.
120. See, Reichert-Facilides, supra note 59.
1993] TRANSBOUNDAR Y RADIATION POLLUTION 187
A class action approach would create the necessity for each affected
state to investigate the kind and amount of damages suffered by each
victim. This is an efficient solution since the affected state is in the best
position to investigate. It has access to all data of the victims and can use
its administrative body to prove its losses. This would certainly be the
cheapest way to investigate damages and the affected state would be a
party to the arbitration proceedings anyway Nuclear accidents like the
one at Chernobyl harm the public good. Recovery for such harm to the
public good could only be claimed by the state itself.
Furthermore, affected states may indemnify their citizens mdepen-
dently of the right of individual victims to recover from a liable operator.
Such indemnification, for example, was given to German citizens.121 By
virtue of the principle of subrogation, the state becomes the owner of
most rights to indemnification. Subrogation can generally become effec-
tive in two ways: either the state which mdemnifies its citizens requires
assignment of the rights to recover, or the subrogation takes place ex lege
by virtue of applicable substantive law (internal law or international trea-
ties). A subrogation clause in favor of persons who have indemnified
victims can be found in the Vienna Convention, 122 and should be imple-
mented as a general rule in the treaty proposed here.
This construction would encourage all states to provide funds for po-
tential nuclear disasters. As states usually provide quick mdemnification,
such funds bring great relief to victims. However, the decision to create
such funds should be left to each state. If the state indemnifies its citi-
zens, it must then arbitrate in its own name; if not, it represents its citi-
zens. Either way comports with notions of fairness from an international
perspective.
Certain kinds of damages can only be proven on an aggregate basis.
Such damages could be recovered by the state in cumulo when it has a
right to bring a class action. 123 Disbursement of damage payments
would be left to the discretion of the state, and the defendant would be
released from his duty to indemnify the individual victims.
Such damages would include, for instance, losses as a result of in-
creases of certain types of diseases. The increase of diseases (e.g., cases of
cancer) can be proven statistically through proof on an aggregate basis.
According to the expected increase after a nuclear accident, the amount
of losses (especially medical expenses, social security costs, etc.) could be
estimated. These costs could be recovered by the state with proceeds
used for additional compensation, such as medical equipment and social
security payments.
In the same arbitration proceeding, the victims' state could also claim
121. AtG § 38; see also Norbert Pelzer, Atomrechtlicher Schadensausglelch bei aus-
landischen Nuklearunfallen, 27 NJW 1664 (1986).
122. See, e.g., Vienna Convention, supra note 64, art. IX § 1, 2 I.L.M. at 738 (referring
to subrogation clauses in internal laws of the member states).
123. See Handl, supra note 24, at 236.
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its rights under international law against the source state. The single
individual is in general not eligible for such recovery; only the state itself
can claim damages. 124
It has been pointed out that the existing liability agreements, the Paris
Convention and the Vienna Convention, place too much emphasis on the
liability of the operator and thereby unfavorably lessen the source state's
liability under customary public international law to the Victims. 125
However, article XVIII of the Vienna Convention expressly states that
the Convention does not affect "the rights, if any, of a Contracting Party
under the general rules of public international law in respect of nuclear
damage." 126 Criticism of existing liability agreements in the Pans Con-
vention is well-founded. Providing legal protection against radiation pol-
lution demands an "entirely new convention - one that essentially
embodies a private law approach, yet also incorporates elements of state's
international liability. ,,127 The arbitration approach combined with
class action procedures would meet this requirement perfectly States
could invoke arbitration proceedings as preventive measures even before
an accident occurs.
The participation of foreigners in administrative proceedings concern-
ing approval of new nuclear power plants has been an issue of concern in
recent years. 128 A decision in Germany recognizes the right of foreigners
potentially affected by German nuclear power plants to be a party to
admimstrative proceedings. 129 The case concerned a plaintiff from the
Netherlands, a citizen of a member state of the European Atomic Com-
muMty 130 The question arose whether only citizens of member states
have a right to be a party to proceedings. This view was rejected in liter-
ature on the subject.13 1
One problem with participation of foreigners in administrative pro-
ceedings is the potentially large number of people involved. However,
citizens of one state could be represented by their government, and multi-
ple proceedings might be avoided if arbitration is used. Each state could
collect complaints of its citizens -and arbitrate those aggregated com-
plaints with the source state.
In order to make the liability rules enforceable, states would have to
agree to three further points:
* to waive all immunity defenses;
124. 22 NJW 1393, 6 IPRAx 351.
125. Handl, supra note 24, at 232.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 248. Similar proposals are currently discussed within the IAEA. See, e.g.,
Report of the Standing Committee on Lzability for Nuclear Damage, supra note 98.
128. Billingsley, supra note 2, at 344.
129. Judgment of Dec. 17, 1986, Budnesverwaltungsgencht [BVerwG] [highest admin-
istrative court], 12 VersR 322 (1987).
130. Id.
131. Andreas Weitbrecht, Zur Rechtsstellung auslandischer Grenznachbarn im deut-
schen Umweltrecht, 35 NJW 2132, 2132-33 (1987).
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" to hold the arbitral award conclusive and thus enforce it, and
" to ensure the free transferability of the compensatory payments
under the award between the states.
Such provisions can be found in the Vienna Convention and in the rules
of procedure of the ICSID. 132 Those provisions could, mutatis mutandis,
be applied.
D. Questions of Applicable Substantive Law
In general, liability rules must be refined and unified among states.
Protecting the chain of causation, determining methods for investigating
damages and establishing insurance coverage minimums are additional
issues that must be considered m constructing an effective international
treaty.
1. Liability Rules
As mentioned above, a unification of the liability rules is desirable
from the point of view of both parties.133 Uniformity and predictability
are the main arguments in its favor. Such liability agreements already
exist (Pans and Vienna Convention). After the Chernobyl accident, the
IAEA combined those two treaties into the Joint Protocol Relating to
the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Pans Convention of
1988.13 The treaty proposed herein would essentially follow the rules of
the Vienna and the Pans Conventions. However, there are problems
with the treaties which should first be solved.
The main problem is that not all states have signed and ratified the
treaties. The Pans Convention is based on European activities, and the
degree of participation is fairly sufficient. However as Chernobyl shows,
nuclear accidents and their prevention are a global concern. An efficient
system needs support from all countries. The signing and ratification of a
Convention by all states should be encouraged. The bridging of the Pans
and Vienna Convention by the Joint Protocol of 1988 does not yet fully
solve the problem of incomplete support, even though the mutual benefits
for all countries have become apparent.
Limitations of liability as contained in the two mentioned conventions
should also be rethought. 135 The Chernobyl accident gives an idea about
the probable losses resulting from nuclear accidents. This experience
132. Vienna Convention, supra note 64, 2 I.L.M. 727; ICSID BASIC DOCUMENTS.
133. See also Kenneth M. Murchison, Interstate Pollution: The Need for Federal Com-
mon Law, 6 VA. J. NAT. RES. L. 1 (1986) (arguing that federal common law is needed in
cases of interstate pollution within the United States).
134. Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the
Pans Convention, IAEA doc. GOV/2326 Annex I (15 Jan. 1988). See also B.U.N.R.,
supra note 9, at 20.
135. See Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1988); Leslie D.
Lass, Comment, The Prnce-Anderson Act: If a "Chernobyl" Occurs in the United States,
Will the Victims Be Adequately Compensated?, 7 GLENDALE L. Rnv. 200 (1987). See
supra note 69.
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should be used to check the existing liability limits and determine reason-
able amounts. The proposal for a Convention on Supplementary Fund-
ing elaborated by the IAEA is designed to overcome this problem.
The liability of the source state should not be limited or excluded.136
The unification of the rules concerning the liability of the operator
should not mean excluding or limiting the source state's liability under
customary public international law Instead, both bodies of law should
supplement each other.
137
Source states' liability is also very important to give states incentives to
fulfil their duties under public international law. Such duties include en-
suring compliance by operators of nuclear power plants with safety stan-
dards and the notification of other states in case of an accident.138
Public international law should not be the only source of law; "the law
of neighborly relations and other basic principles of international law"
should also apply 139 This proposal contains three main problems. The
law of neighborly relations is mainly customary international law and
not as well defined as the liability rules of the named treaties, thereby
making the results less predictable." 4 According to German doctrine,
there is not yet a principle of strict liability in international law (neither
as a rule of customary international law nor as a general principle of the
laws of civilized countries).141 Strict liability, however, is desirable in
cases of ultra-hazardous activities like running a nuclear power plant.
The named conventions should accordingly establish strict liability 142
Furthermore, international law does not generally give rights or duties to
private persons. 14 1 It would therefore seem necessary to include a provi-
sion which explicitly extends application of international laws to private
persons.
2. Special Aspects Concerning Causation' 44
The question of whether or not regulations of the state where the in-
jury occurs interrupt the chain of causation should not be subject to spe-
cial provisions.145 State regulations should prove reasonable on a case by
case basis. Scientific standards at the time of the taking of the measures
should be decisive as long as there are no internationally unified stan-
dards. Such a unification would be desirable and solve this causation
problem.
136. Handl, supra note 24, at 228.
137. Id. at 232 (discussing restrictions in the Pans Convention).
138. See McBrayer, supra note 99, at 307 n.22 (citing the Tokyo Declaration).
139. Billingsley, supra note 2, at 356.
140. Malone, supra note 13, at 226.
141. Rest, supra note 11, at 615; see also Hartke, supra note 6, at 335-37.
142. Barron, supra note 14, at 671.
143. Malone, supra note 13, at 224.
144. Laura L. Gonsalves, Note, Probability of Causation in Radiation Tort Litigation,
24 TULSA L.J. 479 (1989).
145. See supra Part I.G.
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In contrast, states should be able to recover damages which actually
occurred but are provable only on an aggregate basis. Indemnification
payments could be used to cover increased social costs as a result of an
increase in diseases. With these payments, states would be able to meet
the increased needs for health care. The proposed "class action" is a
sufficient way to enforce such damage payments. 146
3. Deductible Clause
The proposed method of investigating damages by the administrative
body of the victims' state might create a danger of bias against the opera-
tor. Indeed, a government will be more generous knowing that damages
are recoverable from the defendant. The danger, however, would not be
that great; the method of investigating would be subject to the arbitration
proceeding, and the defendant would have all possible objections avail-
able. Nevertheless, there might be a certain 'dark margin.' To avoid
endless and inefficient disputes, the treaty could contain a deductible
clause. A percentage of the damage (either fixed ex ante in the treaty for
all future disputes or fixed by the arbitration tribunal on a case by case
basis) would be covered by the victims' state.
4. Compulsory Liability Insurance147
Both the Paris and Vienna Conventions contain clauses requiring the
operator of a nuclear installation to maintain insurance or other financial
security 148 This insurance clause could be improved by requirmg that
operators have to maintain a certain nummum percentage of their insur-
ance coverage in foreign states. In addition, the arbitral award should be
directly enforceable against the insurer who could be a joint defendant in
the arbitration proceeding. 49 This would make the arbitral award en-
forceable even if the defendant's state refuses enforcement.
Requiring operators to maintain foreign insurance has another consid-
erable advantage. The business of insurance is based on the law of large
numbers. This means that insurers can cover single risks only because
they cover a high number of identical risks. This leads to a distribution
of risks which makes the insurer risk neutral.1 0 In smaller countries, the
number of nuclear installations (i.e., number of identical risks) is very
small. Where an insurer is unable to distribute risk, he is not risk neutral
and he will prefer not to cover the risk at all. A possible solution for
such problems is the development of insurer 'pools' (e.g., all insurers
share the losses of single accidents). Requiring operators to provide in-
146. See supra Part III.C.
147. Reichert-Facilides, supra note 59, at 159.
148. See Pans Convention, supra note 63, art. X, 956 U.N.T.S. at 270; Vienna Con-
vention, supra note 64, art. VII, 2 I.L.M. at 737.
149. Compare Pans Convention, supra note 63, art. VI(a), 956 U.N.T.S. at 267 (leav-
ing this question open for regulation by the victims' state).
150. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 11 (1986).
192 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORT [Vol. IV
surance coverage abroad would create a network of insurance, making
the law of large numbers work. The existence of international insurance
land reinsurance companies would guarantee the practicability of tis
proposal.
The pool system is based on international cooperation. This is due to
the fact that even countries with a strong insurance industry like the
United States and Japan have had to reinsure part of their risks in pools
of foreign countries.' 51 The already existing insurance network can be
demonstrated by the fact that the German pool, Deutsche Kernreaktor-
Verstcherungsgemenschaft [DKVG] receives about 75% of its premiums
from foreign countries.1 52
The existence of insurance coverage will not decrease the deterrent ef-
fect of the liability approach. At first sight, it might be argued that an
operator will not take reasonable precautions when he knows that the
insurance covers losses out of third party liability in cases of accidents.
However, it is well recogmzed that insurance protection, under certain
conditions, does not have negative impacts on the deterrent effect of lia-
bility rules. This is due to the fact that private insurance compames will
not give coverage to operators of nuclear plants unless they take reason-
able precautions. The nuclear plant at Chernobyl would probably not
have been given coverage by private insurers because the low standard of
,safety applied there was well known. 153 Therefore, operators of nuclear
plants would have to take reasonable care in order to get coverage and
would have to keep up security measures in order to maintain the
,coverage.
Tis mechamsm of insurance-based incentives to provide security
measures only works if certain conditions are met.154 First, the pricing
and risk calculation of the insurer has to be accurate. Second, insurers
will only investigate the safety standards of the operators of nuclear
plants when the respective investigation costs are not too high.155 In ad-
dition, transparent and internationally unified liability rules must make
'the financial risk of the insurer predictable.
The compliance with the first two requirements is already demon-
Istrated by the fact that nuclear risks are insured in most parts of the
western world.156 The third requirement, transparency and international
unity of the liability rules, would be fulfilled at least by the treaty pro-
lposed here.
Insurance can do more than just maintain safety incentives for the op-
151. Otto Saxer, Kernenergie und Versicherung Risikoanalyse und Risikobewaltigung,
i58 SCHWEIZERISCHE VERSICHERUNGS-ZEITSCHRIFT [SVZ] 175, 175-77 (1990).
152. Gunter Schmidt et al., Kernreaktor - Versicherer: Klarheit in Grenzwertdiskus-
Isionen bringen, 2 VERSICHERUNG-SWIRTSCHAFT [VW] 152 (1987).
153. Saxer, supra note 151, at 175.
154. Jeffrey Kehne, Note, Encouraging Safety through Insurance-Based Incentives: Fi-
nancial Responsibility for Hazardous Wastes, 96 YALE L.J. 403 (1986).
155. Id. at 403.
156. Saxer, supra note 151, at 177; Abraham, supra note 92.
1993] TRANSBOUNDARY RADIATION POLLUTION 193
erators. 157 Obtaining insurance can improve plant safety m two respects.
First, insurers would be able to obtain detailed information about all ac-
cidents at nuclear plants. Thus, they could develop statistics on the like-
lihood of the occurrence of nuclear accidents. Indeed, this access to
information was already used by insurers to inform operators of nuclear
power plants of the potential for accidents as well as to develop directives
for safety (e.g., a Swiss nuclear risk insurance pool developed directives
for security measures against fire in nuclear plants). 151
Additionally, the fact that the potentially tremendous losses after nu-
clear accidents can only be paid by operators who maintain insurance
will provide a strong incentive to comply with all conditions of the policy
in order to have continued coverage. The operator knows that it will go
bankrupt in the event of an accident if it loses insurance coverage because
of noncompliance with safety standards. The existence of insurance cov-
erage becomes a question of survival for the operator.
E. IAEA - The Appropriate Body to Carry Out the Proposal'59
As already mentioned, the IAEA would be the appropriate body to
carry out this proposal. 16° The IAEA carries on worldwide activities.
Thus, each state would be encouraged to participate and all states would
have an equal opportunity to contribute and introduce their own per-
spectives. The IAEA is well equipped with offices and admimstrative
staff. In fact, ongoing discussions within the IAEA already deal with
similar proposals (e.g., a proposal for an international arbitration
tribunal).
Furthermore, IAEA headquarters are situated in Austria. This is a
political advantage because Austria is a neutral forum for both parties;
'neutral' not only in a political sense but also by virtue of the fact that
Austria does not use nuclear energy. It is one of the very few countries
wich deliberately decided not to use nuclear plants,16 1 when a 1978
plebiscite resulted in a majority vote against use of nuclear energy 162 In
fact, all democratically-elected governments should be aware of this and
thereby be encouraged to enter into international treaties to protect the
environment. Austria could foreseeably play a role in inducing negotia-
tions within the framework of the IAEA in order to enter into the pro-
posed agreement. 163
157. Kehne, supra note 154, at 420 ("Environmental damage can be deterred effec-
tively by insurance-based incentives.").
158. Saxer, supra note 151, at 180.
159. Stuart F Clayton, Jr., The International Atomic Energy Agency: An Expanding
Role in the Post-Chernobyl World, 12 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 269 (1987).
160. Billingsley, supra note 2, at 355.
161. Id. (It could only be a party of arbitration when representing its own victims).
162. 50.47% voted against, 49.53% in favor of use of nuclear energy (64.1% of all
persons entitled to vote took part). Id.
163. Austria was always concerned about legal protection against radiation pollution.
The Austrian delegation would like to stress the importance it attaches to the
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IV. SUMMARY
Legal protection against transboundary radiation pollution is a global
concern. A satisfying solution requires participation of all countries m
elaborating a new convention. This convention should govern all legal
issues arising out of nuclear accidents. The convention should at mini-
mum contain the following requirements:
* it must give effective legal protection to all parties, which means
that all hindrances for full mdemnification of victims must be
overcome;
" it must be efficient, which means especially that litigation costs
should be kept as low as possible;
" it must be politically practicable, which means that the way of ef-
fectuating legal protection of victims must be universally accepta-
ble and give mutual benefits, and
" it must be legally manageable, which means that the contents of the
proposed treaty must not interfere with the legal system of any
State in a way which makes an execution of the treaty impossible.
A liability approach guarantees economic efficiency The operator of a
nuclear power plant should be held strictly liable. His identity should be
publicly registered. As to the procedural issues, mandatory arbitration
would be preferable. States should, after an accident, investigate the
damages to the public welfare as well as to their citizens, and then bring
an action similar to a class action. The applicable substantive law should
be unified in the convention. Special attention should be paid to the
amounts of liability, compulsory insurance, and special aspects of causa-
tion. The appropriate body to carry out this proposal would be the
IAEA, where ongoing discussions already deal with some of the issues
raised in this Article.
broadest possible approach to the problems of long-range transboundary air
pollution. While recogmzing the need to concentrate immediate efforts on the
problems related to sulphur compounds, the Austrian delegation nevertheless
believes that due attention should be given to all pollutants relevant in connec-
tion with long-range transboundary air pollution, including problems connected
with the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Beyond that, the Austrian delegation
wants to express its conviction that all problems relating to the protection of the
environment need to be studied on the widest possible international scale and
that cooperation of all states is needed to combat the negative effects of indus-
trial activities on the environment. In the view of the Austrian delegation such
cooperation should also include the study of possible negative effects resulting
from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy on the environment of a state or states
other than the state within which such activities are carried out.
Draft Report, 5th meeting of the Special Group on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollu-
tion, Jan. 18, 1979, ECE Doc. ENV/AC. 9/CRP 5/Add.3, at 2-3.
